en.osm.town is one of the many independent Mastodon servers you can use to participate in the fediverse.
An independent, community of OpenStreetMap people on the Fediverse/Mastodon. Funding graciously provided by the OpenStreetMap Foundation.

Server stats:

271
active users

#applicationsecurity

0 posts0 participants0 posts today

🎙️ Speaker Spotlight: Meet @aruneeshsalhotra at the OWASP Security Summit, where he'll be sharing critical insights on #DevSecOps #PromptEngineering and #AppSec

Whether you're a developer, CISO, or tech leader, this is your chance to learn actionable strategies from the best in the game.

🗓️ Save the date! Your app security IQ is about to level up. developerweek.com/conference/o

🎙️ Speaker Spotlight: Meet @aruneeshsalhotra at the OWASP Security Summit, where he'll be sharing critical insights on #DevSecOps #PromptEngineering and #AppSec

Whether you're a developer, CISO, or tech leader, this is your chance to learn actionable strategies from the best in the game.

🗓️ Save the date! Your app security IQ is about to level up. developerweek.com/conference/o

"Cloudflare observed exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-27198 (JetBrains TeamCity authentication bypass) at 19:45 UTC on March 4, just 22 minutes after proof-of-concept code was published."

"The speed of exploitation of disclosed CVEs is often quicker than the speed at which humans can create WAF rules or create and deploy patches to mitigate attacks."

#cloudflare #ApplicationSecurity report

blog.cloudflare.com/applicatio

The Cloudflare Blog · Application Security report: 2024 updateCloudflare’s updated 2024 view on Internet cyber security trends spanning global traffic insights, bot traffic insights, API traffic insights, and client-side risks.

I doubt that many of my followers are familiar with Xunlei Accelerator, this application being mostly used in China. I came across it due to its popular Chrome extension with 28 million users. I looked into the security of this applications and… security? What security?

palant.info/2024/03/06/numerou

An overview:
· Program installation directory writable by any user.
· The built-in browser is based on a three years old Chromium.
· That browser exposed a powerful internal API to arbitrary websites (⇨ code execution among others).
· This browser could also be opened by any website loaded in the user’s regular browser, without any user interaction.
· XSS vulnerabilities in the display of messages in the main application, despite using React (⇨ code execution).
· Electron’s renderer sandboxing effectively rendered ineffective.
· Local webserver using “authentication” based on a “secret” hardcoded string.
· Plugin installation can be triggered by any website (⇨ code execution).
· Plugin list downloads via insecure HTTP connection (⇨ code execution).
· Rudimentary HTTP client used in some places, with memory safety issues and recognizing exactly two server responses.
· Tons of outdated third-party code, including (but not limited to) two years old FFmpeg, twelve years old libpng and eight years old zlib.

The vendor fixed the most obvious ways to exploit these issues. With the communication being spotty to say the least, I don’t know whether they plan to do more.

Almost Secure · Numerous vulnerabilities in Xunlei Accelerator applicationLooking into Xunlei Accelerator, I discovered a number of flaws allowing remote code execution from websites or local network. It doesn’t look like security was considered when designing this application.

Make sure you join us tomorrow for our livestreamed training session “OWASP ASVS: Unlocking Stronger Application Security” with Shanni Prutchi, the author of “OWASP ASVS Demystified: A Practical Guide to Web #ApplicationSecurity Testing.” Let us know if you have ideas for future training sessions! #BFLive

bfx.social/4601Aqt

Bishop FoxOWASP ASVS: Unlocking Stronger Application SecurityJoin Shanni Prutchi as she shares her analysis of the 278 verification requirements listed in OWASP's Application Security Verification Standard.

The questions I want answered for any cloud-based password manager:

· Is its encryption approach sane?
· Does the server have access to any plaintext data?
· Can the server manipulate the data?
· Are users being aided in creating safe credentials?
· Do encryption keys or their components ever leave user’s computer?
· Are there encryption backdoors meant to aid account recovery for example?
· Is the client-side software safe from web-based attacks?
· Are there precautions in place to avoid filling in passwords on the wrong websites?
· Are there precautions in place to avoid filling in passwords on compromised websites without user’s knowledge?
· …

The questions media coverage tends to focus on:

· Are there plain text passwords in memory that someone with administrator privileges on user’s machine could read out?